Neither in the world, nor in general, nor outside the world, it is possible to think anything that can be considered good without restriction, unless it is only of good will
Basing the metaphysics of customs, Kant
Kant's attitude towards metaphysical problems is certainly somewhat ambiguous in that he states on the one hand that we do not know nor can we know the absolute (since human knowledge is limited to experience) but, at the same time, he considers man an entity endowed with reason, faculty of the unconditioned, in such a way that metaphysics is considered a natural necessity in man. Man can not be indifferent to the metaphysical problem, for that is why we always take some position on it.
Kant seeks to resolve this apparent contradiction, but not on the gnoseological plane but on the moral plane, in the field of practical reason (that is, reason insofar as it determines the action of man).
While we cannot reach the absolute, we do have some access to something that approaches it. This contact of approach occurs in moral consciousness, or the awareness of good and evil, the right and the unjust, what we must do and what we must not do. Moral consciousness is for Kant, the presence of the absolute or at least part of the absolute in man.
Moral conscience commands in an absolute way, orders unconditionally, tells us: “It is good for me to be kind to him because I will avoid problems”, this would be a criterion of convenience. Moral conscience will say: “I must be kind to him because it is my duty to treat people well” and it does not matter whether it costs me life, fortune, or whatever, the mandate of conscience is not conditioned by circumstances. It may happen that one does not do his duty, but that does not take authority from the absolute mandate. Duty does not imply convenience, satisfaction or strategy; it is an end in itself.
Moral consciousness is then the consciousness of an absolute requirement that is not explained and that makes no sense from the point of view of the phenomena of nature. In nature there is no duty but only happen , a stone “must” not fall, simply “falls”.
While in nature everything is conditioned by the laws of causality in the moral conscience governs an imperative that knows no conditions, a categorical imperative. The moral conscience says 'you will not lie' without conditioning the commandment in any way, it does not establish particular circumstances under which the law is valid or not, the mandanth is always absolutely valid, otherwise it would not be a moral requirement.
Kant differentiates the categorical imperative from the hypothetical imperative . In the latter, the mandate is conditioned or reduced to a particular circumstance: 'If I want to gain his trust, I must not lie' because if it is not important for me to gain his trust, to lie or not to lie, it ceases to be a mandate.
According to Kant's ethics, only good will is absolutely good as it can not be bad under any circumstances:
“ Goodwill is not good for what is done or done, it is not good for its suitability to achieve a goal that we have set ourselves, it is good only for wanting, that is, it is good in itself.” Fundamentation of the metaphysics of customs, Kant
Let us analyze the quoted passage:
Imagine that a person drowning in the river, I do everything I can to save her but I can't. The person dies, anyway.
Let's imagine now that I'm doing everything I can to save her and that I'm successful, saving her life.
Imagine the third possibility: the person is drowning and I catch him by chance while fishing with a large net.
What is the moral value of each of these possible acts imagined? The third possibility would lack moral value because it happens unintentionally. Morally it's neither good nor bad, just neutral. The other two acts are morally good and have the same value, while goodwill is good in itself.
Duty refers to the fact that 'goodwill', under certain limits, cannot manifest itself.
Man is not a purely rational entity, but is also sensitive. Kant will observe that man's actions are partly determined by reason but there are also 'inclinations' such as love, hatred, sympathy, pride, greed, pleasure... which also exert their influence. Man gathers in his jeugo rationality and inclinations, moral law and subjective imperfection of human will. So, goodwill, manifests itself in a certain tension or struggle with these inclinations, as a force that seems to oppose. As conflict becomes present, goodwill is called duty.
If a purely rational will without any influence of inclinations were possible, it would be for Kant a holy (perfectly good) will. In this way, he would perform the moral law spontaneously, that is, without complying with an obligation. For a holy will, 'duty' would then be meaningless, while 'will' naturally coincides with 'duty'. But in man, moral law, it is often in conflict with his desires.
Three types of acts are distinguished:
a. Acts contrary to duty: In the example of the person who is drowning in the river. Suppose that having all the means to save him, I decide not to do so, because I owe that person money and his death will save me from debt. I have acted out of inclination, that is, not following my duty but my desire not to pay off my debt and treasure the money.
b. Acts according to duty and by medium inclination: He who is now in the river is my debtor, if he dies, I will not be able to recover the borrowed money. I saved him. In this case, the duty coincides with the inclination. In this case it is a mediate inclination because the man who saves is a means through which I will get an end (to recover the borrowed money). From an ethical point of view, it is a net act (neither good nor bad).
c. Acts according to duty and by immediate inclination: The one who is drowning is someone I love and therefore I try to save him. Also duty coincides with inclination. But in this case, it is an immediate inclination because the saved person is not a means but an end in itself (I love her). But for Kant, this is also a morally neutral act.
d. Acts done by duty: He who now drowns is a being that is indifferent to me... he is neither debtor nor creditor, I do not love him, simply, a stranger. Or yet, he's an enemy, someone I hate and my inclination is to wish his death. But my duty is to save him, and I do, contrary to my inclination. This is the only case in which Kant considers this to be a morally good act, acts in which it proceeds according to duty and does not follow any inclination.
The moral value of an action does not lie in what one wants to achieve, it does not depend on the realization of the object of action, but consists solely and exclusively in the principle by which it is realized, removing the influence from any desire.
The principle by which an act is performed is called by Kant, the 'maxim' of action, that is, the principle or subjective foundation of the act, the principle that actually leads me to act.
In this line, Kant formulates the categorical imperative:
Work according to a maxim so you can want at the same time to become universal law
In this way, we will act morally only when we can wish our desire to be valid for all. Thus, what is intended is to eliminate the exceptions, being equally valid for all people.