Moore is the initiator of neorealism and analytical philosophy. Moore demonstrates, based on the principle of linguistic analysis, that the idealistic principle of Bekerley (the being of things consists of being perceived) is false for implying illegitimate identification. Every act of consciousness, such as perception, is consciousness of something other than consciousness itself. He will also criticize Bradley's theory of “inner relationships”, for him, no relationship is part of the essence of a thing, but that every relationship is “external”, in the sense that it is not part of the thing because in fact, it might not have it. Consequently, it is absurd to argue that the being and the object are constituted by a relationship (to be perceived) and consists of nothing more than that.
Moore's contributions to ethics are interesting. The author wonders about the meaning of the fundamental concept of “good” and his conclusion is that “good” is a simple and indefinable notion, as is “yellow” and that the same extent that one cannot explain to anyone what is yellow if it is not known, nor can one explain what is good. “Good” is then a simple concept without parts, impossible to analyze and indefinable. Good cannot be confused with things or with the properties of things in which it is found. He observes thus that it is a “naturalistic fallacy” to say that pleasure is good, as does, for example, hedonism. The “good” predicate is nothing existing, it does not denote a real property of natural things. In this way, he concludes that metaphysical ethics is based on naturalistic fallacy.