According to Russell, there are two Wittgenstein among whom there is a remarkable breakup. The common denominator is interest in language.
During the first period, the author will greatly influence the Vienna Circle (to which he never actually belonged). At the second moment, it will be followed by the schools of Cambridge and Oxford.
With regard to logical atomism, this is considered to have been the joint work of Wittgenstein and Russell, although the agreement between the two is not absolute.
Atomist logic assumes that the world is composed of independent and isolated entities, which can be known without reference to the rest of the universe, directly in themselves. The basic idea of logical atomism is that the world possesses the structure of mathematical logic.
For this theoretical framework, the world consists of logical atoms or primary elements on the basis of which the world is built. But this is not enough to characterize the world, it is rather a set of “atomic facts”, or a set of events that are also isolated and independent and not of “objects” and “things”. I am not to say that there are no “things” (composed of “logical atoms”) but, strictly speaking, the world consists only of the facts that happen with or those things: such as “this is red” or “it is snowing”.
Wittgenstein will develop in Tractatus, the most complete view of the issue, we point out as a synthesis:
The world is all that happens
The world is the totality of facts, not things
The world is determined by facts and by being all facts
Because the totality of facts determines what happens and also what does not happen
The facts in logical space are the world
Anything can happen or not happen and all the rest remains the same
What happens, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts
The atomic fact is the combination of objects (entities, things)
It is essential to the thing to be able to be a constituent part of an atomic event
Everything is in a space of possible atomic facts. You can think of that space as emptiness anymore it is not possible to think the thing without space
The object is simple
Objects form the substance of the world, so they cannot be composed
The fixed, exist and the object are one
The object is the fixed, the existing. The variable is the configuration.
The totality of existing objects is the world
Figurative theory
Each atomic fact corresponds, in language, to an atomic proposition that is “true” as it corresponds to the fact in question. According to Russell, the logical proposition is a “symbol” of the fact and there is a “certain fundamental identity of structure” between the two. Wittgenstein exposes in his Tractatus, this world-language correspondence mediates the figurative theory of the world:
We make ourselves figures of facts
The figure presents the states of things in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.
The figure is a model of reality.
To objects correspond in the figure elements of the figure.
The elements of the figure are in the figure instead of the objects.
The figure consists of this: that its elements are combined relative to each other in a certain way.
The figure is a fact.
The fact that the elements of the figure are combined with each other in a certain way represents that things are combined with respect for each other. This connection of the elements of the figure is called structure and its possibility, its form of figuration.
The figurative relationship consists in the coordination of the elements of the figure and of things.
What the figure must have in common with reality to be able to figure it in its own way is its form of figuration.
Every figure is a logical figure (although not every figure is spatial): the logical figure can figure the world.
The logical figure of the facts is the thought
Just because an atomic fact is thinkable means we can figure it out.
The totality of thoughts is the figure of the world.
In short, figurative theory states that a proposition is a “figure” or, in other words, a representation of a fact, because there is isoformism between proposition and fact: they possess the same structure and the same type of relationship between their terms.
The consequences of this theoretical perspective are that logical atomism makes the analysis legitimate. In a monistic logic, any analysis is a sort of distortion of reality where only synthesis is legitimate. The analysis has a double dimension:
It is an analysis of the facts, as it allows to discover its last (and real) components, the logical atoms
Analysis of propositions, such as molecular, atomic propositions
The characteristic of logical atomism is that it defends the isomorphism of fact-propositions, so it proposes that the analysis be carried out on the propositions and not on the facts, since these are easier to grasp than the facts themselves. Isoformism guarantees the identity between the two.
Logical atomism considers only the perfect language of logic as a guide for understanding the world. Hence, the rejection of metaphysics in that its questions cannot be translated into logical language because they do not refer to facts but to indescable problems, about which nothing can be done better than to silence: Everything that can be said can be clearly said; and what cannot be spoken, it is better to be quiet. Wittgenstein
At this stage of Wittgenstein's thought, all the conception developed in the past disappears. Language ceases to be “figure” of facts and it is admitted that there are plurality of languages, each of which is a way of relating to the world. The same language, seems to have its own life: new languages constantly appear and others fall into disuse. But the fundamental thing is that language is an activity and there is only its use: each language is a different linguistic game.
The plurality of languages escapes any systematizing attempt, in such a way, for example, that the meaning of a term cannot be established except by reference to its use. From there, Wittgenstein will say that the function of philosophy should be reduced to:
A descriptive and non-normative function of language
A therapeutic function of language in its illegitimate metaphysical use. Wittgenstein considers that metaphysical thinking is a kind of disease that diverts the use of leguage, so that it is necessary to “cure” these deviations. For example, when philosophers use terms such as “know”, “I”, “nature”, in order to grasp the essence of things, they should ask themselves whether those words really make sense in ordinary language. In this sense, the author gives absolute priority to the ordinary use of language and considers that it is precisely the vice of metaphysics to decontextualize these words and pretend to give them “another” meaning.
Cambridge and Oxford schools
The two dimensions that Wittgenstein indicated for philosophy were collected in a number of ways. The Cambridge school, represented by Juan Wisdom, was devoted to therapeutic analysis and Oxford, which includes among its exponents Ryle, Austin and Strawson, among others, was oriented towards the descriptive function or analysis of the ordinary use of language.